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By sustained I mean long lasting, a very elusive concept in Latin America. The region has 
been dominated by many outbursts of growth, but they have usually ended up in crisis and 
a long period of slow growth. The 1960s and 70s—particularly the former—are 
remembered as periods of high growth, but in those days Latin American growth was 
slower than that of the world and many other regions (table 1). Perhaps the most important 
feature of the 60s was that growth variability across countries in the region was very low. 
In contrast, during the 90s, with the world growing much less, some economies were 
growing strongly, at much higher rates than the rest of the world. But in a number of those 
countries growth came to a sharp stop. Few have been able to cope with scarce capital 
inflows and an unstable international environment for emerging markets. More recently, the 
external atmosphere has been positive for emerging markets, but the issue in many Latin 
American countries is how to resume, or in many cases start, a process of sustained growth. 
These notes focus on the role of openness and the low regional trade among Latin 
American countries, which certainly reveal a weakness to sustain growth. I discuss briefly 
how to avoid crises, a recurrent phenomenon in the region that has been a fundamental 
cause of low growth. Then I tackle one of the most difficult problems in the region, namely 
severe inequalities, and discuss how it can affect the quality of public policy. Finally, I 
discuss more general issues regarding fundamental factors that spur growth.  
 
Before beginning our discussion, we must have a more comprehensive vision of the long-
term evolution of economic growth in Latin America, and compare it with other regions, 
particularly more developed economies. In this way it is also possible to determine whether 
there has been convergence to the level of income the advanced world. 
 
The long run evolution of the gap between per capita GDP en Latin America and 
developed economies for the 20
th century is presented in figure 1.  Each line represents a 
measure of the GDP per capita of Latin America as a percentage of the GDP per capita of a 
sample of advanced economies and the US.  I use data from Maddison (1995) from 1900 
through 1950, and put them together with the Penn World Tables of Heston, Summers and 
Aten (2002) until 2000. In order to build a long series, only the largest economies in the 
region were considered, for which there was information available, namely Argentina, 
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presentations at the University of Southern California, Yale University, and Expansiva. All views expressed 
here are my own.  
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Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
1  Their GDP was calculated in two 
different ways: taking a simple average and weighting by size.   
 
The upper panel in figure 1 considers the simple average of GDPs per capita from 
the seven Latin American countries in the sample, which means that each country is given 
the same weight in the region’s total. The lower panel shows the GDP per capita weighted 
by the GDP of each country, which is equivalent to considering all of them as one large 
economy. For instance, in 1990 Brazil’s GDP accounted for 39% of the total sampled; 
Mexico’s, 23%; Argentina’s, 11%; and the other four, the remaining 27%.  In each case, 
GDP per capita was compared with that of the US and of a group of advanced economies.
2 
At the beginning of the century, the region’s GDP per capita was the equivalent of 43% of 
that of advanced economies and 32% of that of the US (upper panel). In 2000, both ratios 
had dropped to 34% and 24%, respectively, certainly a step backwards. A similar 
turnaround is observed when comparing weighted average GDP per capita with that of 
advanced economies and the US, which went from 37% and 28%, respectively, in 1900, to 
29% and 23% in 2000. 
 
This relapse of the region manifested since the middle of the century, excluding the 
time of the Second World War. The upper panel shows that this decline was persistent and 
stabilized in the nineties. In the sixties and seventies there was some stability and even a 
slight reversal of the fall (lower panel), in particular with respect to the US income. Hence 
the positive vision regarding this period. However, such recovery was due mainly to Brazil, 
which went through its “economic miracle” in those decades (table 1) and has a large 
weight in the region’s GDP.  
 
Therefore, all the second half of the twentieth century was disappointing in terms of 
economic growth, which only stabilized in the nineties. Social turmoil and bad economic 
policies resulting from frustrated growth place this subject at the core of economic debate 
and policy design in the region.   
 
 
Openness and Regional Trade 
 
The explosion of research in the late 1980s on the determinants of economic growth 
produced a wide range of empirical results, and most of the factors that were found to 
promote growth have been questioned by subsequent studies. But within this plethora of 
results, if there is one issue that enjoys broad (but by no means total) consensus, it is that 
trade openness fosters economic growth. More-open economies have been able to grow 
                                                 
1 For the early years of the century there are some gaps in the data that were completed with the averages for 
those economies that had the full series. The countries with incomplete data are: Colombia, 1901-1912 and 
1914-1924; Mexico, 1911-1912 and 1914-1920; and Peru, 1901-1912.  
2 Including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, 
Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The GDP per 
capita was calculated based on weighting by size. 
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faster than closed ones.
3 This is particularly important in periods of trade liberalization. Of 
course, we can add many caveats to the strategy of opening up, the institutional framework 
in which opening up takes place, etc. etc. However, it is a fact that more open economies 
grow faster than closed ones. This lesson is especially valid for small economies. I have not 
been able to find an example of a relatively high-income small economy that is not 
integrated with the rest of the world, or that has been able to grow being isolated from the 
world. 
 
In addition, Winters et al. (2004), in a detailed review of the evidence, find that 
openness is associated with poverty reduction in the long run, and there is even a strong 
presumption that this association holds in the short run as well. Of course, trade 
liberalization may also work with other policies to alleviate poverty. Therefore, trade 
liberalization is good for the economy, and it is advisable to undertake it right away. (The 
same cannot be said of other areas, such as financial liberalization.)  
 
Moreover, the old idea that supported the import-substitution strategy in Latin 
America in the 1960s, which held that opening to trade would result in developing 
countries producing “bad goods”—mostly commodities, whose terms of trade would be 
declining—has been proved wrong. It is true that countries that face unfavorable terms of 
trade grow less rapidly, but it is also true that there has not been such a deterioration of the 
terms of trade (De Gregorio and Lee, 2004).
4 
 
Unilateral trade liberalization has already occurred in most of Latin America and 
more intensely during the 1990s. Indeed, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, i.e. most of Latin America, were 
classified as closed in the period 1970-1989 according to Wacziarg and Welch (2003), and 
as open economies in the period 1990-1999.  
 
Although tariffs may have been reduced and non-tariff barriers may have been 
removed, Latin America still has small trade coefficients. Most Asian countries have 
substantially more trade than Latin American countries (figure 2). Only China is below 
three countries in the sample, but once we correct trade by size, China is also much more 
open than Latin America. Therefore, a natural question is how to increase integration and 
gain access to new markets, given that tariffs and most barriers to trade have been 
substantially reduced.  
 
Moreover, intraregional trade in Latin America is very low when compared with 
other regions of the world (figure 3). It was already low in the 1960s, at about 10 percent of 
the total, and although it has increased in recent years, it remains comparatively low. Trade 
among the South American countries is 24 percent of their total trade, and among all Latin 
                                                 
3 See also Edwards (1998) and Dollar and Kraay (2002). For a more skeptical view, see Rodríguez and Rodrik 
(2001). 
4 Meller (2002) provides a clear of this claim illustration for the Chilean case. He says that in 1980 two tons 
of copper where needed to buy one personal computer, while in 2000 one ton was able to buy 2 personal 
computers, and just bear in mind that in 2004 the price of copper was 50% above that of 2000.   4
American countries it is 17 percent, the lowest among the regions shown in the figure. The 
same pattern of low integration emerges for other country groupings such as Mercosur or 
Aladi (not shown). These findings stand in sharp contrast to the dynamic intraregional trade 
among the East Asian countries: already in the 1960s about 26 percent of these countries’ 
trade was with each other, and that figure has increased to 50 percent in recent years. Trade 
among the industrialized countries has long been an important share of their total trade. 
 
Institutions play a key role in fostering trade. For countries to develop deep and 
extensive trade relations, each must demonstrate at home the ability to enforce contracts, to 
maintain the rule of law, and to establish enduring trade relations. The existence of a stable 
macroeconomic environment is also important, because it reduces uncertainty among trade 
participants. Yet Latin America has weak institutions and is subject to recurrent 
macroeconomic crises, and this impedes the growth of trade linkages. Recent trade 
disputes—some of which, such as the problems over natural gas with Argentina and 





Clearly, in the macro front one size does not fit all. The selection of exchange rate regime, 
integration to international financial markets, and other policy choices have not a unique 
answer. However, the recurrent crisis in the region provides some general principles. But, 
before discussing them briefly, I must clarify that, in my view, a crisis is not a purely 
random phenomenon, and good policy can shield countries from crisis and contagion, while 
enjoying the benefits of integration and financial development. Indeed, recent literature, 
particularly after the Asian crisis, has modeled crisis as a self-fulfilling phenomenon, many 
times unrelated to fundamentals. I do not believe this is the case since here are always 
policy distortions, at the macro or financial level. Crises may be triggered by external 
developments, but the economies affected are never entirely innocent, because crises do not 
occur at random. Contagion and frantic financial markets may make a bad situation worse, 
but in the end there is no substitute for sound domestic policy. Therefore, I do not share the 
view that crises can be bad outcomes of otherwise sound economies. Crises happen because 
of mismanagement. 
 
First, fiscal discipline is key. Most crises in the region have been associated to fiscal 
imbalances. Moreover, countries that were able to recover strongly from their crisis—like 
Chile in 1982 and Mexico in 1994, and also as in most Asian countries in 1997-98—were 
those that had a strong fiscal position before the crisis. Therefore, although not only 
countries with a weak fiscal position are exposed to a crisis, those that have solid public 
finances can recover better. 
 
Regarding inflation, a low rate indicates credible monetary policy and sound 
monetary institutions. Rather than discussing details on monetary policy, stable low 
inflation is a summary statistic for good macroeconomic environment, which also is the 
basis for strong institutions at the macro level. Not only is it desirable to have an 
independent central bank, but it is also necessary to implement good policies. For example, 
a stable macroeconomic environment allows implementing a flexible exchange rate regime   5
and to use monetary policy as the instrument for stabilization, which becomes the most 
effective way for achieving macroeconomic stability. 
 
Perhaps the Achilles heel during crises in emerging markets is their weak financial 
sectors. Liability dollarization, mismatched currencies and maturities, implicit guarantees 
and related lending are among the factors that lead to financial crisis when there are 
significant corrections in relative prices or a curtailment of capital inflows. Prudential 
regulation and strong institutions are important to take full advantage of financial 
development. Contrary to trade liberalization, financial liberalization can be the source of 
problems in a weak institutional setup. The Chilean economy learned this the hard way, 
with a huge financial crisis in the early eighties. 
 
Dollarization happens when trust in the domestic currency is lost. This, in general, 
is the result of rising inflation and sudden and sharp devaluations. Dollarization is many 
times irreversible. Hence, after the economy stabilizes, and the value of the currency too, 
the de-dollarization process may never take place. Chile went a different route, minimizing 
the risk of permanent dollarization. After the 1982 crisis, instead of going into the dollar, 
most financial contracts were linked to the indexed currency (on a daily basis to the last 
month’s CPI) known as the UF (unidad de fomento). Deposits and loans denominated in 
UFs in the banking system increased significantly.
5 As the inflation rate declined, the 
economy has actually “de-UFized”, and currently the peso is the main unit to denominate 
financial contracts. This has been achieved in part by the policy decision to base monetary 
policy on a nominal interest rate. The composition of public debt has shifted from UFs 
toward pesos. Therefore, financial indexation helped in the transition, but is not the 
panacea. The unit in which contracts are written is not the only relevant consideration for 
avoiding dollarization; it is also the ability to enforce and honor financial contracts. The 
dollar is always a superior instrument when the enforcement of contracts is weak. 
 
Currency crises are costly. Empirical estimations indicate that a country that suffers 
a currency crisis has a cost of about 8% in terms of GDP loss, but this cost is doubled when 
a crisis is accompanied by a banking crisis (De Gregorio and Lee, 2004). Of course these 
are averages across countries, and there are many examples in the region where the costs 
have been much higher. 
 
A highly debated proposal to avoid deep crises is capital controls. An example to 
promote capital controls is the Chilean experience during the nineties. Chile was, after all, 
the country that suffered least with the crisis of emerging markets toward the end of last 
decade. In my view, capital controls did not introduce severe costs to the Chilean economy, 
but they were far from responsible of the success of the nineties. Capital controls did not 
prevent contagion from the Asian crisis and did not avoid the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate during the decade. They were fairly ineffective. Their main effect was to tilt 
loan maturity from short-term to long-term, which seems a good thing, but the orders of 
magnitude involved in this shift were fairly small. Moreover, what was at the center of the 
recession in 1999 and also part the massive inflows in the nineties were the rigidities of the 
exchange rate. In recent years, the economy has been able to absorb a very volatile 
                                                 
5 See Herrera and Valdés (2003) for further details.   6
international environment with a flexible exchange rate and without capital controls. It is 
true that today the Chilean economy is not booming, as it was in the past with an 
international environment similar to the current one, but it is better prepared to face adverse 
external conditions. Prudent fiscal policy, based on a rule for the cyclically adjusted budget 
deficit, and a flexible exchange rate as part of an inflation target regime for monetary 
policy, provide more resilience to the Chilean economy to external shocks.
6  
 
Moreover, in contrast to the Chilean case, capital controls have been used as a 
substitute for sound financial policies in many countries. Authorities may think, wrongly of 
course, that instead of doing serious and necessary adjustments in the fiscal and financial 
fronts, they can get away with capital controls. They give the wrong impression that the 
economy is well protected to face external shocks, and delay necessary reforms to 
strengthen macroeconomic institutions. Macroeconomic institutions were the strengths in 
the Chilean case, not capital controls. 
 
 
Inequality, Distortions and Education 
 
One of the most notorious characteristics of Latin American countries is their high level of 
inequality (figure 4). Theory as well as empirical evidence suggests that an unequal income 
distribution is bad for growth, although some recent evidence has challenged this view. The 
theoretical literature emphasizes that inequality can lead to inefficient policies that actually 
harm growth, in an attempt to compensate for severe inequality. The classic case is the 
introduction of inefficient taxation for purposes of redistribution. 
 
Thus, we should expect that, after adjusting for the level of development, countries 
with more unequal income distributions, as measured by the Gini coefficient, are more 
likely to have characteristics and policies that are bad for growth. For example, they have 
lower school enrollment rates, probably because, after controlling for average income, they 
have a larger fraction of the population that cannot afford to go to school. In addition 
countries with greater inequality have higher fertility, larger governments, lower levels of 
educational attainment, and weaker institutions. 
 
Two issues are relevant in this discussion. The first one is what are the policy 
implications to reduce inequality. We know little about policies that can reduce inequality 
of income in a short period of time. Income distribution changes very slow and we do not 
know about its main determinants. The relationship with income is not clear. Education 
helps.
7 Increasing education achievement and reducing differences across the population 
reduces inequality. However its effects take long time to affect income distribution. 
Improving education today will have effects on income distribution many years later, when 
                                                 
6 Cowan and De Gregorio (2005), analyzing the effects of capital controls, argue that the key to explain 
capital inflows, financial vulnerability and currency crises is the exchange rate regime rather than capital 
controls. 
7 There are recent studies on the determinants of income distribution, where education appears to be an 
important factor in reducing inequality. However, as argued in the text, it takes time to turn around inequality 
via education. In addition, recent papers have emphasized the role of financial development in reducing 
inequality. See Li et al. (1998) and Beck et al. (2004).   7
more educated people becomes a significant part of the labor force. But, this should not 
prevent pursuing educational reform, since it has an immediate effect on income mobility 
and the intertemporal distribution of income. Therefore, it contributes to equalize 
opportunities faster than its effects on actual income. Welfare is more equally distributed 
when poor families find their kids receiving better education. 
 
Another issue that is also very relevant in economies with high inequality is how to 
avoid the negative effects inequality has on policies and through them on economic growth. 
It is a very different thing to have a stable unequal income distribution in a country that 
grows from suffering it in another that stagnates. In addition, although growth may have 
small effects on inequality, it is essential to alleviate poverty. Having good social policies, 
which compensate for inequalities and are growth-enhancing, must be a priority. 
Strengthening institutions is particularly important in countries were inequality may be the 
source of corruption and other institutional distortions. The case of Chile is again 
interesting. Despite its large inequality, it does not seem to have deteriorated institutions or 
policies, and the economy has been able to grow, which has been key to reduce social 
conflicts and focus policies on growth and helping the poor. 
 
Although policymakers will in general prefer policies that both increase growth and 
reduce inequality, this is not always the case. Some adopt instead redistributive policies that 
introduce distortions, and fail to adopt other policies that have positive effects on growth 
and inequality. An active policy to encourage high-quality schooling will be good for 
growth and for reducing inequality. Something similar can be said about public 
infrastructure, for example access to safe drinking water. 
 
 
On Growth Fundamentals: Institutions, Competition and Mobility 
 
We could list many areas where improvement is possible and would foster growth. But 
ultimately the question one would like to have answered is, What are the main foundations 
that support the accumulation of human and physical capital and improvements in 
productivity—in short, that determine economic growth? Growth occurs when incentives 
are appropriately in place to make people and firms spend their talents in growth enhancing 
activities, as opposed, for example, to rent seeking or political capture. In my view, two 
basic principles underlie growth: 
 
•  Secure property rights. When people invest in their own human capital, or when 
entrepreneurs invest in plant and equipment or in new techniques to increase their 
productivity, they must be certain that the benefits of these investments will not be 
taken away from them. For this to happen, property rights need to be clearly defined 
and respected. 
•  An adequate structure of rewards. Investment and effort must be adequately 
rewarded. This is essential to encourage creativity, entrepreneurship, and a growth-
promoting allocation of talent. 
 
In terms of policy, securing property rights implies setting clear rules of the game. It 
is inevitable that some policies, or changes in policies, will have redistributive effects.   8
Modifying tax policies, for example, changes the profitability of investment in physical and 
human capital, in effect reducing or increasing the value of that capital. Improving 
regulation, too, often changes profitability. A firm that has become a monopoly may be 
obliged to take steps to reduce its monopolistic power and cut down its profits. In short, 
redistribution happens. In other cases property rights are not clearly defined.  This is the 
typical case in environmental conflicts, for example between the agriculture sector and 
industrial development that brings pollution.  Property rights have their limits and there are 
conflicts as well as gray areas. The important thing is to be clear on those limits and the 
mechanisms to resolve disputes. To achieve this, nations must have strong institutions and 
clear rules to define and delimit property rights, as well as mechanisms for fair 
compensation when changes in policy have redistributive effects. 
 
In a democracy, taxes are generally decided by the legislature, and no one should be 
surprised, although some may not like it, when changes in taxes occur. Of course, a sound 
constitution and good laws will prevent arbitrary enforcement of the tax laws and outright 
expropriation. The lesson here is again on the need to have strong institutions, and these 
institutions must have a clear orientation toward protecting property rights. 
 
A stable macroeconomic environment is also an important part of securing property 
rights. High and unstable inflation also redistributes income, usually from savers to 
borrowers, and this discourages saving. By, in effect, liquidating nominal public debt 
through sharp price increases, inflation also redistributes wealth from bondholders to 
governments. The same can be said of freezes on deposits during banking crises, and other 
confiscatory policies. Macroeconomic stability thus promotes growth by providing a safe 
environment in which to invest, allowing entrepreneurs to focus on the usual and 
unavoidable risks of business, rather than protecting themselves from macroeconomic 
instability. 
 
But the second principle—an adequate reward structure—is also important and 
necessary for growth. One can imagine a country where property rights are secure and 
immutable but the business sector consists of a group of monopolists enjoying significant 
barriers to entry. No one will then have any incentive to invest or to compete: the 
established monopolists have no need to do so, and any potential new entrant will 
encounter clear disadvantages. Therefore, it is not enough to protect property rights, 
although necessary.  The means to establish this second principle in the economic arena is 
competition, full and strong competition, that allows markets to operate efficiently. 
Openness and free trade, in turn, are essential to ensure and increase competition, especially 
in a small economy. In order to compete and succeed, firms will need to operate efficiently 
and creatively. Absent any competitive threat to established business, there will be no 
incentive for these businesses to be efficient. 
 
Regulation and fostering competition has implications regarding the protection of 
property rights and also providing adequate rewards to effort and entrepreneurship. Many 
countries are discussing regulatory reforms to spur growth, and this is good. But, in my 
view, the most important institutional basis is to define how conflicts are resolved, who is 
responsible for setting regulations, and who is charged with administering those 
regulations. Granting independence to and requiring accountability from regulators and   9
defining independent panels to resolve problems (including interpretation of the law) is the 
most important reform hat ensuring stability and fair rules of the game may provide for 
encouraging investment and productivity. However, it is important to foster accountability, 
which is particularly necessary for independent institutions.  
 
The second principle also has implications for social policy. It is important that 
workers, as well as businesses, receive rewards appropriate to their effort. A natural 
aspiration of parents, especially among the poor, is that their children live more prosperous 
lives than their own. For this they need opportunities. A person’s income from labor will 
depend on the productivity of that labor, and so the goal of educational policy must be to 
transfer useful knowledge and thus transform people into more productive workers. Stated 
more generally, this second principle translates into social mobility, or equal opportunity, 
on the social front.  
 
We can better understand difficulties in Latin America in the light of these two 
principles. In many Latin American countries institutions are weak, the macroeconomic 
environment is unstable, and therefore property rights are not properly safeguarded. In 
addition, trade is still very low, and hence the scope for competition is limited. Therefore, 
investors are not always well rewarded. On the other hand, the quality of education must be 
improved, and efforts to reduce inequality through social policies aimed at improving the 
living conditions of the poor and creating conditions for greater social mobility, must be 
reinforced. From the point of view of government activities, it is important to focus on how 
to foster growth and help the poor and the disadvantaged, while minimizing policy 
distortions. This is not a trivial challenge, but as long as growth can be sustained, the job is 
made easier, because populist temptations are then reduced, although never eliminated. 
   10
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 Table 1: Growth of Per Capita GDP   
    
  1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 1960-2000  1970-2000
LATIN AMERICA     
Argentina  2.29% 1.38% -3.87% 4.22% 1.00%  0.57%
Bolivia  0.60% 2.01% -2.22% 1.08% 0.37%  0.29%
Brazil  4.23% 5.67% -0.26% 1.46% 2.77%  2.29%
Chile  2.19% 1.22% 1.28% 4.79% 2.37%  2.43%
Colombia  2.23% 3.11% 1.35% 0.87% 1.89%  1.78%
Costa Rica  1.85% 2.59% -0.94% 1.75% 1.31%  1.13%
Ecuador  1.35% 6.16% -1.17% -0.85% 1.37%  1.38%
El Salvador  2.24% 0.05% -1.66% 2.30% 0.73%  0.23%
Guatemala  2.44% 3.05% -1.21% 0.84% 1.28%  0.90%
Jamaica  3.43% -1.14% 1.72% -1.05% 0.74%  -0.16%
Mexico  3.28% 3.27% -0.43% 1.78% 1.97%  1.54%
Nicaragua  3.25% -2.70% -3.00% -2.42% -1.22%  -2.71%
Panama  4.98% 3.35% -0.69% 1.96% 2.40%  1.54%
Paraguay  1.70% 4.46% 1.01% -0.58% 1.64%  1.63%
Peru  3.73% 0.45% -3.13% 2.47% 0.88% -0.07%
Uruguay  0.43% 2.70% -1.00% 2.81% 1.23%  1.50%
Venezuela  2.95% -2.79% -1.36% -0.80% -0.50%  -1.65%
Avg 2.05%  1.56% -0.74% 0.98% 0.96%  0.60%
REFERENCE    
Japan  9.27% 3.09% 3.53% 1.05% 4.23%  2.55%
USA  2.87% 2.66% 2.16% 2.30% 2.50%  2.37%
East Asia (9)  4.69% 5.36% 4.45% 3.95% 4.61%  4.58%
World  2.53% 1.99% 0.98% 1.32% 1.70%  1.43%
Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002)   
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Figure 1: Latin America Relative Per Capita GDP (%)
(a) Simple Average
(b) Average Weighted by GDP
   Source: Maddison (1995) and Heston, Summers and Aten (2002).  For data description see




























































































































































































































































Source: World development indicators, Department of Statistics of Taiwan, Singapore Statistics. All figures are
expressed in dollars of each year.
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Figure 4: Income Distribution in the 1990s
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Source: World Bank